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Utah International, Inc. v. Watt:
Adjudicative or Legislative Hearing
INTRODUCTION
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
(SMCRA)' has inspired reams of commentary 2 and scores of cases
on almost every provision. 3 Its widespread applicability4 and
staged implementations5 guarantee that this trend will continue
for some time to come. Section 1272, "Designating Areas Un-
suitable for Surface Coal Mining"6 is one aspect of SMCRA
scrutinized by commentators7 and courts.8 This section has pro-
' Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. V
1981)) [hereinafter cited as SMCRA with section reference to U.S.C.].
2 See, e.g., Barry, The Office of Surface Mining and the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act: Moving Targets or Immovable Objects, 27 RocKY MT. MIN. L. INST.
169 (1982); A Summary of the Legislative History of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 and the Relevant Legal Periodical Literature, 81 W VA. L. REv.
775 (1978-79); Note, Constitutional Challenges to the Surface Mining Control and Reclama-
tion Act, 43 MONT. L. REv. 235 (1982).
3 See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
ing and Reclamation Ass n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus, 655
F.2d 763 (6th Cir. 1981); In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 653 F.2d
514 (D.C. Cir.), cert. demed, 454 U.S. 822 (1981); In re Surface Mining Regulation Litig.,
627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
4 Any state with surface mining activity is affected and must either implement a
federally approved state program (primacy), or the federal government, through the Of-
fice of Surface Mining (OSM), will regulate mining within its boundaries. See 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1253, 1254 (Supp. V 1981). Permanent regulatory programs are in force in Alabama,
Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virignia, West Virginia and Wyoming. Washington
Report, COAL WEEK 2 (July 26, 1982). See generally Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Ass n, 452 U.S. at 268-72 (discussing SMCRA and its pertinent provmons).
5 See 30 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (Supp. V 1981) (interim regulations); 30 U.S.C. § 1251(b)
(Supp. V 1981) (permanent regulations). See generally 452 U.S. at 268-72 (discussing the
promulgation of regulations by SMCRA).
6 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (Supp. V 1981). For text of statute relevant to this discussion,
see notes 9-11 tnfra.
7 See Buskirk & Dragoo, The Designation of Coal Lands as "'Unsuitable"for Sur-
face Coal Mining Operations, 27 RocKY MT. MIN. L. INsT. 339 (1982); Gorrell & Russell,
The Petition Process for Designating Lands Unsuitable for Surface Mining Operations,
71 Ky. L.J. 57 (1982-83).
8 See Hodel v. Vingnia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass n, 452 U.S. at 304-05
(§ 1272 found not facially unconstitutional in pre-enforcement review); Utah Int'l Inc.
v. Watt, 553 F Supp. 872, 886 (D. Utah 1982) (motions for summary judgment stem-
ming from unsuitabilty designation granted in part and denied in part).
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visions and standards for both mandatory 9 and discretionary"0
designations of unsuitability for surface coal mining. Additional-
9 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) provides for mandatory designations as follows:
(e) After the enactment of this Act and subject to valid existing rights no
surface coal mining operations except those which exist on the date of enact-
ment of this Act shall be permitted-
(1) on any lands within the boundaries of units of the National Park
System, the National Wildlife Refuge'Systems, the National System of
Trails, the National Wilderness Preservation System, the Wild and Scemc
Rivers System, including study rivers designated under section 5(a) of
the Wild -and Scenic Rivers Act and National Recreational Areas
designated by Act of Congress;
(2) on any Federal lands within the boundaries of any national forest:
,Provided, however, That surface coal mining operations may be permit-
ted on such lands if the Secretary finds that there are no significant recrea-
tional, timber, economic, or other values which may be incompatible
with such surface mining operations and-
.."(A) surface operations and impacts are incident to an underground
coal mine; or
(B) where the Secretary of Agriculture determines, with respect to
lands which do not have significant forest cover within those national
forests west of the 100th meridian, that surface mining is in compliance
with the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendment Act of 1975, the National Forest Management
Act of 1976, and the provisions of this Act: And provided further,
That no surface coal mining operations may be permitted within the
boundaries of the Custer National Forest;
(3) which will adversely affect any publicly owned park or places included
inthe National Register of Historic Sites unless approved jointly by the
regulatory authority and the Federal, State, or local agency with jurisdic-
tion over the park or the historic site;
(4) within one hundred feet of the outside right-of-way line of any public
road, except where mine access roads or haulage roads join such right-
of-way line and except that the regulatory authority may permit such
roads to be relocated or the area affected to lie within one hundred feet
of such road, if after public notice and opportunity for public hearing
in the locality a written finding is made that the interests of the public
and the landowners affected thereby will be protected; or
(5) within three hundred feet from any occupied dwelling, unless waiv-
ed by the owner thereof, nor within three hundred feet of any public
building, school, church, community, or institutional buildings, public
,park, or within one hundred feet of.a cemetery.
10 30, U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3) provides for discretionary designation as follows:
(3) Upon petition pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, a surface area
may be designated unsuitable for certain types of surface coal mining opera-
tions if such operations.will-
(A) be incompatible with existing State-or local land use plans or pro-
grams; or
LANDs UNSUITABLE
ly, the designation process applies, with some differences,Il to
both federal lands12 and lands administered by a state regulatory
authority 13
On December 16, 1980, then Secretary of the Interior Cecil
Andrus designated certain areas of the Alton coal fields14.in
southern Utah unsuitable for surface coal mining'5 pursuant to
an unsuitability petition filed with the Department of the Interior
(B) affect fragile or historic lands in which such operations could result
in significant damage to important historic, cultural, scientific, and
aesthetic values and natural systems; or
(C) affect renewable resource lands in which such operations could result
m a substantial loss or reduction of long-range productivity of water supply
or of food or fiber products, and such lands to include aquifers and aquifer
recharge areas; or
(D) affect natural hazard lands in which such operations could substan-
tially endanger life and property, such lands to include areas subject to
frequent flooding and areas of unstable geology.
(emphasis added).
"' Both federal and state regulatory agencies, through application of 30 U.S.C.
1272 (a)(4)(D), must provide a petition process as outlined in 30 U.S.C. § 1272(c). Sec-
tion 1272(b) requires the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a review of federal lands
and to withdraw any unsuitable lands from leasing programs or condition mineral leases
to limit surface mining operations. States are additionally required to develop specific im-
plementation procedures and structures:
(4) To comply with this section, a State must demonstrate it has developed
or is developing a process which includes-
(A) a State agency responsible for surface coal mining lands review;
(B) a data base and an inventory system which will permit proper evalua-
tion of the capacity of different land areas of the State to support and
permit reclamation of surface coal mining operations;
(C) a method or methods for implemeting land use planning decisions
concerning surface coal mining operations; and
(D) proper notice, opportunities for public participation, including a
public hearing prior to making any designation or redesignation, pur-
suant to this section.
30 U.S.C. § 1272 (a)(4).
12 30 U.S.C. § 1272(b), (e).
13 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a), (e).
14 The unsuitability petition applied only to federal lands. See Utah Int'l v. Watt,
553 F Supp. at 876. Federal ownership of the mineral eliminates from this limited discussion
the position of a mineral owner. See id.
15 The Final Petition Evaluation Document was released on November 26, 1980,
Secretary Andrus' decision was issued on December 16, 1980, and the Statement of Reason
was published on January 13, 1981. See 553 F Supp. at 884.
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in late 1979.16 This was the first petition submitted to the
Secretary of the Interior 17 under the discretionary provision of
section 1272.18 Secretary Andrus' decision was challenged in
three lawsuits, which were later consolidated into Utah Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Watt.19 One of the issues raised by this case and
by later unsuitability petition proceedings2o is the propriety of
the legislative hearing provided by the regulations2' as opposed
to an adjudicatory hearing.Y
The dichotomy between rulemainga and adjudication24 is
one of the cornerstones of administrative law,25 but it also
presents a difficulty to our legal system. This difficulty is
highlighted by the application of this dichotomy within the lands
unsuitable petition process.
This Comment focuses on the unsuitability designation peti-
tion process found in section 1272 of SMCRA. First, the general
legal principles of rulemakang and adjudication will be reviewed
briefly The Comment will then describe the theory underlying
the petition process, and indicate some problems the process has
16 Petition of the Sierra Club to Designate Certain Federal Lands in Southern Utah
Unsuitable for Surface Coal Mining Operations, 45 Fed. Reg. 3,398 (1980) (public notice
by OSM of receipt of a. complete petition published January 17, 1980) [hereinafter cited
as Petition of the Sierra Club].
17 553 F Supp. at 876.
18 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3). See note 1O, supra for text of the statute.
19 553 F Supp. at 876.
20 See Proceedings of Lands Unsuitable for Surface Mining Petition No. LUM 83-1
(available at the Kentucky Department of Natural Resources). Kentucky petition requesting
designation of lands in Butler and Ohio Counties was demed. Instead, all permit applicants
had to comply with special regulation requiring archeologic survey of permit area, as per
Order: In re Lands Unsuitable Petiiton 83-1 (July 11, 1983) (located in University of Ken-
tucky College of Law Mineral Law Center). See also Application for Intervenor Status
filed by Kentucky Energy Cabinet, May 6, 1983 (located in University of Kentucky Col-
lege of Law Mineral Law Center).
21 Cf. 30 C.F.R. § 764.17(a) (1980) (discretionary petition process for state
regulatory programs); 30 C.F.R. § 769.16(a) (1980) (discretionary provision in regula-
tion of federal hearing process). See generally Buskirk & Dragoo, supra note 7 at 389 n.217.
2 553 F Supp. at 880-81.
23 See note 40 infra for the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) definition of
rulemaking.
24 See note 39 infra for definitions of adjudication.
25 "[T]he entire [Administrative Procedures] Act is based upon a dichotomy between
ruIlemaking and adjudication." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUALON THE ADMINisTRATIVE PRo-
CEDURES AcT 14 (1947) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL MANUAL].
1983-84] LANDS UNSUITABLE
had in practical application. Finally, the application of the legal
principles of rulemaking and adjudication to the lands unsuitable
petition process as found in Utah International, Inc. v. Watt6
will be analyzed.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RULEMAKING
AND ADJUDICATION
Action by administrative agencies takes essentially two
forms: 27 adjudication, 6 which is similar to the functioning of a
court; and rulemakang, 9 which is similar to the legislative func-
tions of a body of law makers. Each form of action has procedures
and practices appropriate to its character. 3° For example, an ad-
judication typically is "on the record,"3' so any resultant decision
must be based on evidence presented and recorded at a formal
hearing. The hearing officer cannot act as investigator as well as
judge. 3 Procedural safeguards such as cross-examination,
discovery, and standards of admissibility of evidence generally are
part of an adjudication.-- Adjudication is the administrative
equivalent of a trial.
20 553 F Supp. at 872. See notes 74-75 tnfra and accompanying text for a brief
background on the case.
27 See generally APA, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. §§ 500-76 (1982)). The APA governs the action and procedures of administrative
agencies and was enacted to "introduce greater uniformity of procedure and standardiza-
tion of administrative practice among the diverse agencies whose customs had departed
widely from each other." Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41, modified on
other grounds, 339 U.S. 908 (1950). Section 553-57 of the APA outline the procedures for
rulemaking and adjudication. For discussmion of the relevant sections of the APA, see general-
ly 339 U.S. at 36-41 (discussing the APA and its legislative history); ATTORNEY GENERAL
MANUAL supra note 24 at 14; K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12:3 (2d ed.
1979) (discussing the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts); Boyer, Alter-
natives to Administrative Thal-Type Hearngs for Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic,
and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REv. 111 (1972-73) (discussing criticism of current ad-
ministrative procedures); Note, The Requirement of Formal Adjudication Under § 5 of
the Administrative Procedures Act, 12 HARv. J. ON LECIS. 194 (1974-75) (discussing the
adjudication procedures under the APA).
28 See 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982).
29 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
30 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1982).
31 See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a).
32 See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d).
3 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).
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On the other hand, a legislative hearing or a rulemaking ac-
tion resembles a session of the legislature.34 Public comment is in-
vited, but usually rules of evidence, testimony under oath and
cross-examination are not available. In fact, there may be no oral
hearing at all.35 Decisions can be based on the investigations of
the decision-making officer, advice from the administering agen-
cy, or evidence gleaned from the public.36 Therefore, the deci-
sion is not restricted to evidence on the record. 37
The difference between the two forms of administrative ac-
tion is easy to understand. The difficulty lies in determimng which
form is appropriate in a particular circumstance. This difficulty
has inspired courts and commentators to devise many and vaned
approaches to its solution. 38
34 See 5 U.S.C. § 533 (1982).
"' See 5 U.S.C. 9553(c). See also 5 U.S.C. § 556 (procedures when a legislative hear-
ing is required by statute).
36 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
37 Id. (unless specifically required by statute).
38.See BiMetallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (city-
wide property assessment change by rulemaking declared constitutional); Londoner v.
Denver; 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (specific road improvement assessment by rulemaking af-
fected a few individuals who were entitled to a hearing). See also United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972) (valid exercise of rulemaking authority to alleviate
freight car shortage); ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913) (addressing a con-
flict between ruleriaking and adjudication of rail rates); American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.) (transportation rate setting case), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 843 (1966). See generally Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.v. Natural
Resources Defense Council; Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (licensing of nuclear power plant);
Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 598F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (EPA hearing concerning toxic wastes);
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costel, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir.) (EPA hearing concern-
ing discharge of heated water), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Anaconda v. Ruckelshaus,
482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973) (EPA rulemaking concerning sulfur oxide emsmions);
Austern, Food Standards: The Balance Between Certainty and Innovation, 24 FOOD DRUc
COSM. L.J. 440 (1969) (discussing procedural guidelines for determining food standards);
Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 'VA. L.
REV 585 (1972) (discaissing adjudicatory procedures within a nuclear power ad-
ministrative hearing); Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Ap-
plicability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF.
L. REV. 1276 (1972) (discussing the APA guidelines for adopting varied administrative
procedures); Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law
in Judicial Review of Environmental Decwonmaktng: Lessons from the Clean Air Act,
62 IOWA L. REV. 713 (1976-77) (discussing procedural variances applied tO administra-
tion of the Clean Air Act).
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Another difficulty involves defining "adjudication 39 and
"rulemaking." 41 By defining these terms, the nature of the action
An early analysis of the difference between adjudication and rulemaking forms was
presented by Supreme Court decisions i BiMetallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 239 U.S. at 441, and Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. at 373. Londoner involved an
individual taxpayers protest of an assessment for street repairs as a denial of his right to
an adjudicatory hearing. 210 U.S. at 374-75. The assessment affected only a small number
of people. The Court in Londoner concluded that the individual's lack of opportunity to
be heard was a denial of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 210 U.S.
at 385-86.
Conversely, BiMetallic Investment was a tax protest of a city-wtde change in assess-
ment rates implemented without affording each affected taxpayer the opportunity of an
adjudicatory type hearing. 239 U.S. at 444. The Court i BiMetallic Investment conclud-
ed that where a proceeding affects a group of people, no adjudicatory hearing need be
afforded each individual. Id. at 445-46. The Court explained its distinction of the two
cases as follows:
The question then is whether all individuals have a constitutional right to
be heard before a matter can be decided in which all are equally
concerned.
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is im-
practicable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adop-
tion. There must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if
government is to go on.
Id. at 445.
Initially, these cases were interpreted to mean that the number of individuals af-
fected was the deciding factor in determimng the kind of form and procedure to be ap-
plied. See generally Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d at 118; Anaconda v. Ruckelshaus,
482 F.2d at 1306-07 (discussing the quantitative factor rule of Londoner and BiMetallic
Investment). However, subsequent cases indicate that, although a significant factor, such
numbers are not dispositive m choosing adjudicative or rulemaking procedures. See generally
United States v. Florida E. Coast R.R., 410 U.S. 224, 244-46 (1973) (rulemalang pro-
cedures held appropriate for formulating industry wide regulations); United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. at 756-57 (rules alleviating freight car shortages
formulated by legislative procedures upheld); ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88
(rate change applied to a single railroad was violative of due process absent proper hear-
ing); WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 620-21 (2d Cir.) (rulemaking held ap-
propnate for change affecting entire industry), cert. dented, 393 U.S. 914 (1968); American
Airlines v. Civil Aeronatuics Bd., 359 F.2d at 627 (general rulemalang permissible means
of agency regulation of carriers), cert. dented 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
39 Compare the APA definition of adjudication in 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (1982) ("agen-
cy process for the formulation of an order") and the APA definition of order in 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(6) (1982) ("the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative,
injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter othdr than rulemalang but
including licensing") with Cramton, supra note 37, at 587-88 ("Adjudication'may be defined
as a process in which the affected parties are guaranteed a right to participate through
presentation of proofs and reasoned argument, and in which a decision is made by ra-
tionally applying general principles to particular facts").
40 The APA defines rulemaking as an "agency process for formulating, amending
1983-84]
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can be more clearly identified, thus allowing the selection of ap-
propriate procedures. Toward this end, one comentator, Kenneth
Culp Davis, introduced the concept of "legislative facts" and "ad-
judicative facts."41 Davis suggests that courts and agencies should
characterize the nature of the facts to be determined, rather than
try to characterize the nature of the action.42 Thus, if legislative
facts are involved, rulemaking procedures are required,
43
whereas if adjudicative facts are to be determined, an adjudica-
tion is necessary 44 Yet, Davis himself admits that the distinction
or repealing a rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(5). A rule is defined as:
[T]he whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular ap-
plicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe
law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice re-
quirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the
future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations
thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of
valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the forego-
ing.
5 U.s.c. § 551(4).
41 Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HAsR. L. REV. 364, 402-10 (1942). This distinction and analysis has been more fully
delineated in DAVIS, supra note 27, at § 12:3 (a full delineation of the distinction). The
Londoner-BiMetallic analysis (see note 38 supra) and Davis's "legislative and adjudicative
facts" distinction (see notes 43 and 44 snfra) are parallel themes which are m general accord.
42 DAVIS, supra note 27 at § 12:2.
43 Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are the
general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of the law and policy
and discretion.
Because the parties may often have little or nothing to contribute
to the development of legislative facts, the method of trial often is not re-
quired for the determination of disputed issues about legislative facts.
Id. § 12:3, at 413.
44 Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did what,
where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent.
Facts pertaining to parties and their businesses and activities, that
is, adjudicative facts, are intrinsically the land of facts that ordinarily ought
not to be determined without giving the parties a chance to know and to
meet any evidence that may be unfavorable to them, that is without pro-
viding the parties an opportunity for trial. The reason is that the parties
know more about the facts concerning themselves and their activities than
any one else is likely to know, and the parties are therefore in an especial-
ly good position to rebut or explain evidence that bears upon adjudicative
facts.
LANDs UNSUITABLE
between these classifications is "unhelpful and unsatisfactory on
some problems. 4
5
The problem of choosing appropriate procedures for an agency
action is rooted in the difficulty of determining the nature of the
action. 46 Each dispute presents a different context in which
definitions must be applied,47 and frequently, a proposed pro-
ceeding has elements fitting the definitions of both rulemaking
and adjudication. 48 The lands unsuitable petition process is one
such hybrid situation. 49
Perhaps the most effective means of determimng appropriate
procedures is a balancing of the competing interests.5s Legislative
procedures protect the interests of efficiency and practicality5l
Broad issues create actions involving a multitude of interests, people
and organizations, each with a umque outlook on the action. In
such a situation, a bi-polar proceeding becomes difficult.52- Thus,
legislative proceedings have been found to be more effective in
the formulation of broad policy decisions affecting large portions
of society - On the other hand, adjudicative procedures are a
protection of individual rights and are especially effective in adver-
sarial and bi-polar situations.-4 Information collected in an ad-
judication may be more accurate than that of a legislative hear-
ing, due to the availability of discovery, standards of evidence,
rebuttal and cross-examination. 5 In determining which pro-
45 Id. § 12:3, at 415.
46 See :d. § 12:4.
47 See td.
48 Id. § 12:3, at 416.
49 Increasingly, agencies are formulating hybrid actions composed of a mixture of
legislative and adjudicative procedures. See Boyer, supra note 27 at 116-69 (discussing
the procedural needs of multifaceted issues). Tis hybrid approach has been met with mixed
success and response. "[P]olycentric controversies exhibit a blend of technical, factual and
political attributes that often seem nearly impossible to separate or accommodate within
a single procedural network framework." Id. at 169. See also Stewart, supra note 38 at
729-33.
50 Boyer, supra note 27, at 169; DAvis, supra note 27, at 386-88.
51 See DAVIs, supra note 27, at § 12:3.
52 Boyer, supra note 27, at 169.
' See generally Cramton, supra note 38, at 585 (discussing adjudicatory procedures
within a nuclear power administrative setting); Davis, supra note 41 (discussing procedural
problems within an administrative hearing setting).
54 See Boyer, supra note 27, at 169.
5 DAvis, supra note 27, § 12:2, at 410.
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cedure to use, courts have balanced the efficiency and effectiveness
of requiring a hearing for an affected individual against the due
process rights of that individual. 56 This type of analysis can be a
useful tool in an examination of the current dispute within the
SMCRA lands unsuitable petition process.
56 BiMetallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. at 445. This type of
balancing can be seen in the BiMetallic Investment-Londoner analysis. See note 38 supra.
One commentator has outlined a criteria of "accuracy," "efficiency," and "acceptability"
to balance "the advantages and disadvantages of each procedural system." See Cramton,
supra note 38, at 592-93. Cramton outlines his criteria as follows:
In striking this balance, I believe that the following formulation of com-
peting considerations is more helpful than "fairness" or "due process" the
extent to which the procedure furthers the accurate selection and determina-
tion of relevant facts and issues, the efficient disposition of business, and,
when viewed in the light of the statutory objectives, its acceptability to the
agency, the participants, and the general public.
The first consideration, accuracy, serves as a short-hand reference to
the rational aspects of a decision-making process. The ascertainment of truth
or, more realistically, as close an approximation of reality as human frailty
permits, is a major goal of most decision-making. There are better and worse
ways, in various contexts, of gathering relevant information, selecting or for-
mulating controlling principles, and applying the correct principles to the
probable facts. Accuracy, moreover, is not only a facet of each case but an
aggregative or system characteristic of uniform and consistent results that
give equal treatment to similarly situated persons. Accurate results in a par-
ticular instance ("justice in the individual case") may be less important in
many areas than a high degree of consistency in the decision of a large number
of cases.
The second consideration, efficiency, emphasizes the time, effort, and
expense of elaborate procedures. The work of the world must go on, and
endless nit-picking, while it may produce a more nearly ideal solution, im-
poses huge costs and impairs other important values. In the polycentric ad-
ministrative case, the efficiency of trial procedures meets the severest test.
This criterion, unlike the others, is capable of quantitative statement since
time and effort may usually be stated in dollar terms. Concern with public
costs and expenditures must not be allowed to obscure the fact that the private
costs of administrative delay are usually far higher than the total of govern-
mental costs.
The final consideration, acceptability, emphasizes the indispensable
virtues of procedures that are considered fair by those whom they affect,
as well as by the general public. Usually this translates into meamngful par-
ticipation in the decisional process. The authority of decisions in a society
resting on the consent of the governed is based on their general acceptabili-
ty. Moreover, if procedures are deemed fair by those immediately affected,
their cooperation and assistance can be obtained, with the result that ad-
ministrative action will be better informed and thought out.
Id. at 592-93 (citations omitted; italics in origihal).
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II. LANDS UNSUITABLE: THEORY AND
PRACTICAL APPLICATION
The Designation of Lands Unsuitable for Surface Coal
Mining is an aspect of land use control and protection under
the SMCRA.-8 In theory, the process of petitioning to have cer-
tain areas declared unsuitable for mining couldbe of assistance
to the coal industry, the regulatory authority and concerned
citizens by identifying large areas to be removed'from surface coal
mining prior to the permit stage. By mang the assessment at a
pre-permit stage, thereby avoiding the extensive and expensive per-
Applying this balancing test to Londoner and BiMetallic Investments illustrates its
usefulness. In Londoner, the validity of the taxpayer's protest can be rore accurately assess-
ed by allowing theprotestor to present and defend proof of his claims than by collecting
written comments. Hearing the protests of a few taxpayers should not seriously hinder
the agency s efficiency. Additionally, because this assessment was applicable to only a few
individuals, acceptability of the assessment action is essentially directed.tp just those few
taxpayers. Using these factors, the balance swings in favor of adjudicatory procedures.
See Londoner v. Denver, 210.U.S. at 373. See also note 38 supra for a discussion of BiMetallic
Investment and Londoner
On the other hand, BiMetallic Investment's tax protest involved all taxpayers in the
city of Denver. Accuracy might be served to some extent by individual hearings, but any
gain in accuracy is far offset by the burden placed upon efficiency. Additionally, the tax-
payers of Denver were all treated equally, making the action more acceptable than one
which singled out just a few. See 239 U.S, at 441. See also note 38 supra.
57 For a brief analysis of the designation section of SMCRA, § 1272,,see Correll &
Russell, supra note 7, at 59-60:
Section 522 of SMCRA sets forth three ways in which lands can be designated
unsuitable for all or certain types of surface mining. First, section 522(e)
contains a per se prohibition on surface mining operations in certain areas
such as those within the boundaries of national parks and other federal systems
or within specified distances from various facilities such as public roads, parks
and occupied dwellings. Second, section 522(b) requires the Secretary of the
Interior to conduct a reviw of federal lands to determine -areas which are
unsuitable for all or certain types of surface coal mining. If the federal lands
review indicates that in certain areas mining would beincompatible with
historic, ecological or other values, the Secretary is required to withdraw
those lands from mineral development. Finally, section 522(a) of SMCRA
establishes a petition process by which the regulatory authority can designate
areas on state lands as unsuitable for all or certain types of coal mimng where
mining would conflict with other landtuses or where other values are found
to be more important than mining.
Id. (citations omitted).
'8 See 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. V 1981).
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mit application and review process, the regulatory authority would
save all parties both time and money -9
The petition process, 60 the segment of section 1272 with
which this Comment is concerned, generally applies to cohesive
units of land that possess common area-wide characteristics wich
mandate that they be withdrawn from future mining.61 Unfor-
tunately, the petition process has not lived up to theory in the few
instances in which it has been used.62
59 Congress apparently intended the petition process for designating lands
unsuitable for mining to fall between the site specific permit review pro-
cess and the general federal and state land use reviews. The legislative history
reveals that the petition process was designed as an administrative means
for private parties to request review of areas larger than mine sites where
common area-wide characteristics justify an unsuitability designation.
Correll & Russell, supra note 7, at 62 (citing H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
95 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. RP. No. 218, with page references to the report]).
Gorrell and Russell later returned to an analysis of legislative history:
Congress stated that it hoped to help the coal industry avoid unproductive
investment by identifying lands as unsuitable earlier than would occur
through the permitting process or the broader state and federal reviews. H.R.
REP. No. 218, supra note 59, at 95. By preventing unproductive investment,
Congress tried to minimize land uses conflicts which often surround coal min-
ing operations. S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1977).
Id. at 81 (citations in original).
60 The petition process is outlined at 30 U.S.C. § 1272(c):
Any person having an interest which is or may be adversely affected
shall have the right to petition the regulatory authority to have an area
designated as unsuitable for surface coal mining operations, or to have such
a designation terminated. Such a petition shall contain allegations of facts
with supporting evidence which would tend to establish the allegations.
Within ten months after receipt of the petition the regulatory authority shall
hold a public hearing in the locality of the affected area, after appropriate
notice and publication of the date, time, and location of such hearing. After
a person having an interest which is or may be adversely affected has filed
a petition and before the hearing, as required by this subsection, any person
may intervene by filing allegations of facts with supporting evidence which
would tend to establish the allegations. Within sixty days after such hear-
ing, the regulatory authority shall issue and furnish to the petitioner and
any other party to the hearing, a written decision regarding the petition,
and the reasons therefore. In the event that all petitioners stipulate agree-
ment prior to the requested hearing, and withdraw their request, such hearing
need not be held.
61 See generally Petition Process for Designation of Federal Lands as Unsuitable for
All or Certain Types of Surface Coal Mining Operations and for Termination of Previous
Designations, 30 C.F.R. § 769 (1982) (describing the administrative procedure process).
62 See, e.g., Petition of The Sierra Club, supra note 16, at 3,398; Petition of the West
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For example, the decision not to designate as unsuitable the
lands affected by a West Virginia petition 63 was based, at least
in part, on the fact that the petition area did not exhibit common
area-wide characteristics. 4 A Montana petitions concerning
lands near the Tongue River was denied because of the impossibili-
ty of reaching area-wide conclusions regarding the physical state
of the land.6 Whether there are any large areas which exhibit
common area-wide characteristics leading to unsuitability designa-
tion has yet to be demonstrated.67
The factual problems inherent in implementing this law create
procedural problems which the regulations are not designed to
meet.6 According to the regulations, unsuitability designation is
based on agency review, supplemented by legislative fact-finding
hearings.69 A legislative hearing is generally called for when
Virginia Highlands Conservency to Designate Federal Lands in the Shavers Fork Basin
as Unsuitable for Mining, 45 Fed. Reg. 41,542 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Shavers Fork
Basin]; Petition of the Northern Plains Resource Council for Designation of Certain Lands
in Rosebud and Powder River Counties, Montana, as Unsuitable for Surface Coal Mining
Operations, 46 Fed. Reg. 30,202 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Powder River].
A petition was filed with the Kentucky Department for Natural Resources on February
9, 1983, by Charles Niquette of Lexington, Ky., seeking an unsuitability designation of
lands in Ohio and Butler Counties. See LUM 83-1. Public hearing was held in Hartford,
Ky. on May 10, 1983 (petition located at Kentucky Department of Natural Resources).
See Commonwealth of Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet,
Order: In re Lands Unsuitable Petition 83-1 (July 11, 1983) (order located at University
of Kentucky College of Law Mineral Law Center).
63 See Shavers Fork Basin, note 62 supra.
64 See Decision and Policy Recommendations in Response to a Petition Filed by West
Virginia Rivers Coalition at 11, Reclamation Commission of the West Virginia Dep't of
Natural Resources (Jan. 29, 1982) (recommendations located at the University of Ken-
tucky College of Law Mineral Law Center).
65 See Powder River, note 62 supra.
66 Decision and Statement of Reasons: Petition to Designate Lands Unsuitable for
Surface Coal Mining at 11, Montana Department of State Lands (Dec. 1981) (located at
the University of Kentucky College of Law Mineral Law Center).
67 See generally Gorrell & Russell, supra note 7, at 69-71 (discussing the Montana
case (note 66 supra)).
r8 See id. at 72-74 (procedural problems mentioned include property interests, nature
of the proceeding, and understanding the adversarial nature of the hearing).
69 30 C.F.R. § 768.17(a) (1982). The regulations specifically state that the public
hearing shall not include cross-examination. Id. Other common procedural safeguards have
also been omitted. See id. Once a petition is found to be complete, petitioner has no burden
to prove his allegations. 30 C.F.R. § 769.14(d) (1980). "The failure to assign the ultimate
burden of proof to a party making an allegation leaves in doubt the standard for a deci-
sion where scientific data on that issue are lacking, inconclusive or conflicting." Buskirk
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broad issues of policy and specialized scientific data must be
considered. 70 A designation proceeding must examine large areas
for consistently fragile, historic or environmental factors. 71 Ad-
ditionally, this type of proceeding usually concerns large numbers
of interested parties. A legislative hearing thus would allow all
parties an opportunity to comment, without the procedural
nightmare of deciding which parties should be permitted to cross-
examine, subpoena, or conform to other similar procedural
safeguards.72
Conversely, the petition process is often one fraught with
adversity and one which deals directly with interests which man-
date the protections of adjudication. Utah International, Inc. v.
Watt73 illustrates some of the potential interests which may be
involved in the petition process.
& Dragoo, supra note 7, at 391. "[W]here governmental action seriously injures an m-
dividual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used
to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has the op-
portunity to show that it is untrue." Greene v McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959)
(discovery and rebuttal). "We have emphasized in recent years that procedural due pro-
cess often requires confrontation and cross-examination of those whose word deprives a
person of his livelihood." Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96,
103 (1963) (procedural requirements of denial of admission to the bar). Among other pro-
cedural requirements lackang are power to subpoena witnesses and standards of admissibility
of evidence. See 30 C.F.R. § 769.
70 Trial-type procedures, it is argued, are not well adapted to the broad
investigations of social, economic and scientific fact and policy that are
required in order to set rates in regulated industries, to determine ap-
propriate levels of competition, to monitor the introduction of new
technology, or to protect the public from unsafe products or harmful com-
mercial practices.
Cramton, supra note 38, at 586 (citation omitted).
71 See H.R. REP. No. 218, supra note 59, at 95. See also 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3) (see
note 10 supra for text of this provision).
72 Even when the new law or new policy will have direct and vital impact
on the interests of nonparties to adjudication in court or in an agency, non-
parties customarily are given no notice or opportunity to be heard, whereas
in notice and comment rulemaking anyone who cares to do so may pre-
sent written comments and have them considered. In this vital respect,
adjudication procedure is seriously inferior to notice and comment rulemak-
ing procedure.
DAVIS, supra note 27, § 12:5, at 421.
73 553 F Supp. 872 (D. Utah 1982) (mem.) This is a consolidation of three suits aris-
ing from the December 16, 1980 decision of then Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus
designating certain lands in southern Utah as unsuitable for mining pursuant to a petition
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III. UTAH INTERNATIONAL, INC. V WATT
The Alton coal fields petition, 74 and its resultant decision,
Utah International, highlight the hybrid nature of the lands un-
suitable proceeding. Factors which can best be handled by
legislative action, such as policy decisions and a wide range of af-
fected parties, are present. Yet other important factors are pre-
sent which must be dealt with by adjudication. The federal lands
designated unsuitable by Secretary Andrus were subject to outstan-
ding coalleases to two mimng compames, Utah International, Inc.
(UII) and Nevada Electric Investment Co. (NEICO).75 A mineral
lessee's property rights7 6 are significant and deserve the due pro-
cess protection afforded by an adjudicatory hearing. Additional-
ly, while the evidence used to support the unsuitability designa-
ton concerned the existing and planned operations of those af-
fected companies, neither rebuttal nor cross-examination on this
evidence was available, thus bringing into question the accuracy
of both the evidence and its interpretation.
7
filed November 28, 1979. Id. at 877. The court's decision upheld Secretary Andrus' designa-
tion of a portion of the petition area as unsuitable. See ui. at 878-81. This Comment focuses
on only that portion of the opinion of the court which deals with general principles ap-
plied to procedural protections.
74 The petition applied only to federal lands. Only a portion of the 203,900
acres of federal land included within the petition area was designated as
unsuitable for surface mining. This area is commonly referred to as the
Alton Coal Fields and lying generaly northeast of these coal fields is Bryce
Canyon National Park which is situated on the edge of the Paunsaugunt
Plateau. UII and NEICO had obtained coal leases for areas located within
the designated areas during the period 1961-68 and claim to have spent
substantial amounts in their development. The unsuitability designation
precluded UI1 and NEICO from extracting the coal through surface min-
ing. The original petition suggested several reasons why the area should
be designated as unsuitable for surface mining. Contentions were made
that the land could not be reclaimed following surface mimng, that min-
ing would adversely impact Bryce Canyon National Park and visitors to
the park, that mimng would adversely affect water resources and renewable
resource lands (i.e., grazing and agricultural lands), and that alternative
energy resources were available. The Secretary rejected all reasons con-
tained In the petition except the adverse impact on the park and its visitors.
Id. at 876.
75 Id. at 875.
76 See text accompanying notes 85-97 infra for a discussion of lessee property rights.
77 553 F Supp. at 880-81.
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In determining the ideal procedural means for dealing with
these competing interests, it must be remembered that ad-
ministrative agencies have broad discretionary powers in deter-
mining applicable procedure within their mandated authority 78
The Administrative Procedures Act 79 serves as a floor by setting
out rules which delineate the minimum procedural requirements
with which agencies must comply 80 In addition to the statutory
floor, the courts have long recognized exceptions to the agencies'
absolute discretion. 8l The United States Supreme Court in Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council82 outlined two such exceptions: "constitutional con-
straints or extremely compelling circumstances." 83 A mineral
lessee's property rights should satisfy the "constitutional constraint"
of due process.
A. Property Rights of a Mineral Lessee
In essence, the unsuitability designation stripped UII and
NEICO of their property rights.8 4 A mineral lease is a property
interest in the coal in place,85 "sufficient to maintain an action
78 See e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (review of Atomic Energy Commission procedure regarding
licensing of nuclear reactors). "Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights m
the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them
if the agencies have not chosen to grant them." Id. at 524.
7 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-76.
80 See U.S.C. §§ 553-57. See also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41
(concerning the procedural scope of the APA), modified on other grounds, 339 U.S. 908
(1950).
81 E.g., Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978).
82 435 U.S. at 519.
83 Id. at 543.
84 553 F Supp. at 876-77; P MCGINLEY & D. VISH, CoAL LAw AND REGULATION §
83:03(1) (1983).
85 "[A] mining lease vests the lessee with the right to exclusive possession of the estate
and the right to profits derivable from the severence and sale of the coal. The interest
of the coal lessee is regarded as a possessory estate in land. "MCGINLEY & ViSH, supra
note 84, § 83:03(1), at 83-7. "[A] mining lease, being a conveyance of a nonfreehold in-
terest in property, is subject to the statute of frauds and state laws regarding conveyence
of property interests." Id. § 83:03(2), at 83-9. See United States v. Atomic Fuel Coal Co.,
383 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1967) (U.S. condemnation of land for flood control). "In short, en-
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for trespass,"86 and sufficient to share in a condemnation
award. 87 Thus, if the Department of the Interior wished to con-
demn a part of the leased property for a right of way, rather than
designate it unsuitable for mining, the government would be re-
quired to compensate both the surface owner and the mineral
lessee. If this interest is sufficient for a condemnation award, surely
it is a sufficient property interest to trigger due process protec-
tions. The court in Utah International stated: "The extent of pro-
cedural rights available for protection of a property interest is
dependent upon legal arrangements which may qualify or define
the scope of a party's legal interest in the property "88
The court further stated that because the leased property in
Utah International was not permitted for mining, the lessee's in-
terest was not sufficient to require due process. 89 This would
tirely aside from the matter of compensability, it is that only a lease, and not a license,
gives an immediate interest in minerals in their natural state." Id. at 4. In this lease, the
grantor "was conveying to the other party title to minerals while in place, and according
to hun the right to take them from the ground as and when he desired, provided he paid
the reserved royalties." Id. at 5. See generally Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass n, 452 U.S. at 306 (Powell, J., concurring) (who considers "taking" of
proprietary rights to be a factual determination to be resolved in each case).
8 MCCINLEY & VISH, supra note 84, § 83:03(i), at 83-8; Cf. Von Coerlitz v. Turner,
150 P.2d 278, 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944) (a lease gives exclusive possession of the premises
against the world including the owner).
87 Allowance of compensation of Atomic is not payment for the frustra-
tion of a prospective business opportunity as the Government suggests. Here
the United States has taken the minerals in the ground belonging to Atomic
in the lease period. This is vastly different from the mere preclusion of a
future exploitation of the mining lands. It is reimbursement for property
actually taken. The potential productivity of the lease is looked to only
to ascertain its value.
United States v. Atomic Fuels, 383 F.2d at 5 (citations omitted).
88 Utah Int'l v. Watt, 553 F Supp. at 879 (citation omitted). This author agrees
with the court's statement, but questions the interpretation of a mineral lease. Cf. Cor-
rell & Russell, supra note 7, at 73 ("The United States Supreme Court has interpreted
the due process guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to require a mean-
ingful hearing when property interests are at stake.") (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972)).
89 553 F Supp. at 879.
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perhaps be true of a mere license9 or possibly a profit a prendre9'
where the developer's interest in the coal is not vested until the
coal is removed. A lease, however, transfers an immediate pro-
perty interest in the coal in place92 regardless of the status of
mining permits.93
The court in Utah International believed that prohibiting sur-
face mining did not foreclose the possibility of deep mining.9
But many areas potentially affected by the designation process can
only be mined by surface methods.95 Further, the definition of
"surface coal mining operations" includes the surface effects of
underground coal mimng and support facilities, as well as the rmn-
ing methods of contour strip, area strip, auger and mountaintop
removal. 96 Consequently, the application of this definition could
serve to preclude deep mining as well as surface mining. In such
situations, an unsuitability designation is tantamount to complete
divesture of a mineral lessee's property rights. 97
90 A license is a privilege to remove coal, personal to the licensee. It is generally
revocable at will, non-exclusive, and not a sufficient possessory interest to support an ac-
tion for trespass or ejectment. A license also will not be a sufficient property interest to
share in a condemnation award. 4 COAL LAW AND REcULATION, supra note 84, § 83:02(2),
at 83-8, 9. See also Radke v. Union Pacific R.R., 343 P.2d 1077, 1086-87 (Colo. 1959)
(a mineral lessee acquires a possessory interest in the property, a licensee has no such
interest).
91 "A profit a prendre is a right to enter the land of another and take products of
the soil." MCGINLEY & VISH, supra note 84, § 83:03(5), at 83-1. A "profit" is a non-
possessory right of entry and right of profit, as opposed to a license which is a mere privilege.
Although it is granted more judicial protection than a license, it is not comparable to a
lease. Id. at § 83:03(5). See also Trimble v. Kentucky River Coal Corp., 31 S.W.2d 367,
368-69 (Ky. 1930) (defining a profit a prendre).
92 See note 85 supra for a discussion of a mineral lease as a property interest in the
coal in place.
93 Neither the district court in Utah International nor this Comment addresses the
issue of due process protections for fee owners of coal. Yet the court's position that a lack
of mining permits somehow lessens a lessee's property rights indicates that perhaps a fee
owner without mimng permits would also be demed due process considerations by the court.
94 553 F Supp. at 879.
95 A coal seam that is too thin, too near the surface, or which is overlain by unstable
material could not be effectively mined by underground methods. See generally CRicnIER
& ZEGEER, ELEMENTS OF PRACTICAL COAL MINING (2d ed. 1981) (discussing the logistics
of surface mining).
96 See 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28)(A) (Supp. V 1980).
97 The question of an unconstitutional "taking" has been only prospectively litigated.
The Supreme Court has found that § 1272 is not unconstitutional on its face:
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B. Nature of the Action
The Alton coal fields designation adversely affected only two
companies. As the court pointed out, individual effect does not
automatically trigger adjudication. 98 What should automatical-
ly trigger a full adjudication is the effect of a designation pro-
ceeding on UII and NEICO's property rights. In fact, the number
of mineral property interests affected should not be a considera-
tion. If one hundred mineral lessees held property interests in the
petition area, each should be entitled to adjudicatory proceedings.
The agency's efficiency interest will be affected, but can perhaps
be met by characterizing the adjudication as a class action. The
interests of accuracy and acceptability are much too great to forego
due process protection when property interests are at stake.
Although the mandatory provisions of section 127299 are also
used to remove coal property from development, they are con-
sistently applied to every mining interest in the country The peti-
Although we conclude that a "mere enactment" of the Act did not effect
a taking of private property, this holding does not preclude appellees or other
coal mine operators from attempting to show that as applied to particular
parcels of land, the Act and the Secretary's regulations effect a taking. Even
then, such an alleged taking is not unconstitutional unless just compensa-
tion is unavailable.
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass n, 452 U.S. 264, 298 n.40 (1981).
"The 'taking' issue remains available to, and may be litigated by, any owner or lessee
whose property interest is adversely affected by the enforcement of the Act." Id. at 306
(Powell, J., concurring).
New regulations promulgated by the Office of Surface Mimng (OSM) have specifically
drawn the "taking" issue into the lands unsuitable designation process. 48 Fed. Reg. 41,312
(1983). Section 761.5 Definitions now defines valid existing rights as existing where:
[T]he prohibition caused by § 522(e) of the Act, if applied to the property
interest that exists on the date the protection comes into existence, would
effect a taking of the person's property which would entitle the person to
just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
48 Fed. Reg. 41349 (1983).
Although the taking issue is outside the scope of this Comment, this definitional change
may remove the types of property interests of UII and NEICO from the lands unsuitable
process.
98 Utah Int'l v. Watt, 535 F Supp. at 880. See also Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d
91 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing the individual effect within context of toxic substance
discharge proceeding); Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973)
(discussing the individual effect within context of sulfur oxide emissions proceeding).
99 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e). See note 9 supra for text of this provision.
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thon process uses discretionary criteria to individually and selec-
tively affect mineral property without due process for those whose
property has been affected.10 The criteria for a finding of un-
suitabilty are remarkably similar to the various criteria considered
in the permit review process. 10' The permit review process,
however, is applied consistently to all mineral developers, leading
to the conclusion that the discretionary lands unsuitable petition
process is unnecessary and superfluous, as well as a violation of
due process.
In addition to its effect on property rights, the Alton coal fields
designation decision relied heavily on umque and specific infor-
mation derived from past, present and prospective activities of
UII and NEICO 102 The court in Utah International labeled this
information as specific legislative facts103 and therefore ap-
propriate for legislative hearings.04 Yet, the court failed to ex-
amine what really happens in this type of action. In the Utah In-
ternational proceedings, an agency used facts concerning coal
lessees as part of the designation process to effectively cancel the
mineral leases and, therefore, property rights 05 without giving
the barest protections of due process to those whose property was
affected.
IV PROTECTION OF INTERESTS
Some interests and concerns of the broad based policy type
admittedly demand legislative hearing.16 Environmentally
related questions are frequently determined by subjective analysis
influenced by a constantly changing national policy The use and
disposition of federal lands concern the entire nation. 10 7 The im-
portance of each of these interests mandates that some type of
100 See 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3). See note 10 supra for the text of this section.
101 See note 110 tnfra for the permit application requirements.
102 553 F Supp. at 880-81.
103 Id. at 880.
104 See DAVIS, supra note 41 at 402-10.
105 Federal mining leases may generally only be cancelled or forfeited by suit in
federal district court. See 30 U.S.C. § 188 (Supp. V 1981).
106 See note 70 supra discussing the need for legislative hearings.
107 "[T]he decision affects the national interest in the park and each individual who
visits the park." Utah int'l v. Watt, 553 F Supp. 872, 880 (D. Utah 1982).
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forum be provided for the expression of ideas, suggestions and
grievances in the execution of a fair decision.
To reach a "fair decision," the agency must strike a balance
by providing a means of general input by a variety of interests
while still providing protection for those whose property rights
are affected. The permitting process attempts just such a
balance.' °8 The permitting process operates on a site-by-site basis
and applies a ngorous review which examines, among other things,
the types of concerns that would typically be the cause of a peti-
tion for designation. 1 9 In the process, all interested parties have
adequate opportunity for input into the decision.io When an ap-
plication for a mining permit is approved or denied, SMCRA pro-
vides an opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing.' l
108 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1256-60.
1M Compare 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3) with general permit requirements outlined
below (discussing discretionary designation).
Among the permit application requirements are: (1) technological assurance
that the affected land will be restored to a condition capable of supporting
the uses which it was capable of supporting prior to any mining, or higher
or better uses; (2) assurance that the operator will minimize disturbances
of the prevailing hydrologic balance at the mine site and associated off-site
areas; (3) assurance that the operator will minmize disturbances of the quality
and quantity of water in surface and ground water systems, both during and
after surface coal mining operations and during reclamation; (4) assurance
that the operator will contain or dispose of all toxic wastes, other mine wastes,
tailings and coal processing wastes; (5) assurance that all reclamation ef-
forts will proceed in an environmentally sound manner, and (6) assurance
that the operator will restore original contours except as otherwise authorized,
eliminate steep slopes and otherwise eliminate all site specific impacts of the
mine operation. Gorrell & Russell, supra note 7, at 6 n.25 (citing 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1257-58).
110 SMCRA mandates that public notice and an opportunity for public com-
ment be provided in connection with the submission of an application for
a surface coal mining and reclamation permit. Any person having an in-
terest which is or may be adversely affected by the proposed mining opera-
tion has the right to file written objections with the regulatory authority and
to request that an informal conference be held on the permit application.
Following the approval or disapproval of the permit application the appli-
cant or any person with an interest which is or may be adversely affected
may request a hearing on the reasons for the final determination. Such a
hearing is governed by the requirements of the Federal Administrative Pro-
cedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554.
Correll & Russell, supra note 7, at 61 n.26 (citing 30 U.S.C. §§ 1263-64) (citations omitted).
111 See 30 U.S.C. § 1264(c). Several commentators have suggested that the lands un-
suitable process is superfluous in light of the permitting process. E.g., Gorrell & Russell,
supra note 7, at 82. Cf. Buskirk & Dragoo, supra note 7, at 339.
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CONCLUSION
The Utah International decision serves to highlight problems
inherent in the Designation of Lands Unsuitable for Surface Coal
Mining petition process. SMCRA and the corresponding regula-
tions do not adequately protect property interests of mineral owners
and mineral lessees. The interests affected could be better served
by the use of an adjudicatory proceeding at least with regard to
property interests.
Recently, there has been action reflecting the dissatisfaction
with legislative hearings in this type of proceeding. New regula-
tions promulgated by the Office of Surface Mining reflect signifi-
cant changes in the hearing requirements."2 These changes," 3
which include discretionary use of subpoena power and limited
cross-examination in the hearing process, are a step in the right
direction.11
112 Amendments to Part 764-State Processes For Designating Areas Unsuitable for
Surface Coal Mining Operations, 48 Fed. Reg. 41,351-54 (1983); Amendents to Part
769-Petition Process for Designation of Federal Lands as Unsuitable, 48 Fed. Reg.
41,354-56 (1983).
113 48 Fed. Reg. 41,353 (1983) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 764.17) (state process
hearing requirements) provides in part: "The regulatory authority may subpoena witnesses
as necessary. The hearing may be conducted with cross-examination of expert witnesses
only. A record of the hearing shall be made and preserved according to State law. No
person shall bear the burden of proof or persuasion." The federal process hearing re-
quirements found at 41,356 30 C.F.R. § 769.17(a) state in part: "OSM may subpoena
witnesses as necessary. The hearing may be conducted with cross-examination of expert
witnesses only. A record of the hearing shall be made and preserved. No person shall bear
the burden of proof or persuasion." Id.
OSM has responded to the dissatisfaction with the designation hearing process by
instituting limited, discretionary procedural protections. However, its commitment to a
legislative hearing process is evident in its criteria for decision, outlined in 48 Fed. Reg.
41,356 (1983) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 769.18) (state process) which requires that:
"(a) In reaching its decision, the regulatory authority, shall use-(i) The information con-
tained in the data base and inventory system; (2) Information provided by other govern-
mental agencies; (3) The detailed statement when it is prepared under § 764.17(3); and
(4) Any other relevant information submitted during the comment period. 48 Fed Reg.
41,354.
The corresponding federal process regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 41,356 (1983) (to be
codified at 30 C.F.R. § 769.18) are substantially the same.
114 Additionally, a federal district court in Virginia recently upheld a state regula-
tion which authorizes the "hearing's officer in some instances to permit cross examination
at designation hearings." Virginia Citizens for Better Reclamation, Inc. v. Watt, No.
82-0077-R, slip op. at 10 (E.D. Va. Apr. 1, 1983). The court noted that "the availability
LANDS UNSUITABLE
Dispensing with the discretionary lands unsuitable petition
process altogether and relying on the more stringent and fairer
permitting process might well be the best option. But regardless
of the method, some action must be taken to address the problem
of the use of a legislative hearing in the designation petition process.
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of cross examination is of significant utility in the accurate finding of fact." Id., slip op.
at I1.
Illinois has gone one step further and set out specific procedural requirements for
designation hearings including cross examination, power of subpoena and standards of
evidence. See IlL. Admin. Reg. § 1764.17(a). Except for the Illinois regulation, these changes
do not fully address the problem of using a legislative hearing in the designation petition
process.
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